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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Barclay Dylan Bennett appeals from his convictions by a jury for possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Law enforcement went to the home of William Bailey to arrest Bennett on several 
outstanding felony warrants. (PSI, pp.1-2.) The police found a plastic container with 
methamphetamine located among Bennett's possessions on a dresser in the room 
Bennett was staying. (PSI, p.2.) The state charged Bennett with possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of paraphernalia, and a felony enhancement for being a 
persistent violator. (R., pp.48-50.) 
At the close of the state's case at trial, Bennett made a motion to dismiss the 
case pursuant to Rule 29. (Tr., p.96, L.17 - p.97, L.4.) The district court denied the 
motion, finding there was "enough evidence from which a reasonable jury, by 
implication, could find the toiletries [located on the dresser with the methamphetamine] 
were Mr. Bennett's." (Tr., p.104, Ls.22-24.) Bennett did not present any evidence. (Tr., 
p.105, L.1 - p.106, L.1.) The jury ultimately convicted Bennett of both possession of 
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.179-180.) Bennett 
then entered a conditional guilty plea to the persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., 
p.111, L.14-p.114, L.15.) 
Bennett filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal following the guilty verdict 
based on his claim of an insufficiency of the evidence to prove he possessed the 
controlled substance in question. (R., pp.181-182.) He simultaneously filed a Rule 34 
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motion for a new trial alleging the jury was improperly instructed as to the law relating to 
constructive possession. (R., pp.183-184.) Although both matters were set for hearing, 
the parties submitted the issues on their respective briefs without presenting any 
argument to the court. (Tr., p.120, Ls.6-15.) The court issued a written decision finding 
the jury was properly instructed and reiterated its finding at sentencing that there was 
sufficient evidence presented at trial upon which a reasonable jury could find Bennett 
guilty. (R., pp.233-237; Tr., p.126, L.17- p.127, L.22.) 
The district court sentence Bennett to a unified term of nine years with the first 




Bennett states the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Whether the jury was properly instructed on the applicable law and if the 
district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 34. 
2. Whether the evidence against Mr. Bennett was sufficient to support the 
convictions and the district court erred in denying Mr. Bennett's motions 
for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29. 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is there substantial evidence in the record to support the jury's verdicts finding 
Bennett guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug 
paraphernalia? 
2. Has Bennett failed to show any error in the district court's refusal to instruct the jury 




There Is Substantial Evidence In The Record To Support The Jury's Verdicts Finding 
Bennett Guilty Of Possession Of Methamphetamine And Possession Of Drug 
Paraphernalia 
A. Introduction 
Bennett argues on appeal that the jury's verdicts finding him guilty of possession 
of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were not supported by adequate 
evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-20.) Bennett specifically claims "[w]hile the State did 
establish Mr. Bennett's proximity to the illegal contraband and arguably a reasonable 
inference supporting his knowledge of its existence, there is insufficient evidence 
suggesting Mr. Bennett had control over the methamphetamine and paraphernalia to 
establish constructive possession." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) Because there was 
substantial evidence presented at trial showing he possessed or constructively 
possessed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, Bennett's argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285-86, 77 P.3d 956, 974-75 (2003); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). The appellate court will not substitute its view 
for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the 
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. 
Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 683-84, 99 P.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2004) (plurality); State v. 
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Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Decker, 108 
Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). 
In determining if the evidence is substantial and competent, it will be considered 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 
P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. 
Substantial evidence is present when a "reasonable mind" could conclude that guilt was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hoyle, 140 Idaho at 683-684, 99 P.3d at 1073-
1074. 
C. Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury's Verdict That Bennett Had Constructive 
Possession Of Methamphetamine And Drug Paraphernalia 
An "appellate court's function is not to weigh and consider the contradictions and 
inconsistencies which appellant finds in the testimony, but rather to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict of the jury, taking the view of the 
evidence most favorable to the sustained party." State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 292, 
668 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Ct. App. 1983). Actual possession requires possession and the 
knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 
240-241, 985 P.2d 117, 120-121 (1999). Constructive possession "exists where a 
nexus between the accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise 
to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, 
had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance." State v. 
Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 595, 944 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1997). Therefore, the 
relevant inquiry is limited to whether there is substantial evidence in the record 
supporting the jury's verdicts that Bennett knew about the presence of the 
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methamphetamine and paraphernalia on the dresser among his belongings, and either 
had physical control of it or the power and intention to exercise dominion and control 
over it. (See R., pp.78, 165; ICJI 421.) The record reveals there was substantial 
evidence supporting the jury's verdict that Bennett was guilty of possession of 
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Bailey testified that Bennett was staying in his daughter's room: 
Q. Okay. Without specifying the dates, towards the end of September 
was a Mr. Barclay Bennett staying in your house? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many days did he stay in your house? 
A. Two days. 
Q. Two days. And what room of your house did he stay in? 
A. He was in my daughter's bedroom. 
(Tr., p.86, Ls.14-22.) Although a believed "meth user" stayed in Bailey's daughter's 
bedrooms two months before Bennett's visit, Bailey testified he had access to his 
daughter's room and had never seen the plastic container with methamphetamine 
police found there. (See Tr., p.87, L.4 - p.91, L 12.) 
The officer who entered the room where Bennett was temporarily staying testified 
that when he entered the bedroom he saw two people. (Tr., p.22, Ls.19-22.) One was 
Bennett and the other was a female. (Tr., p.24, Ls.7-17.) The officer testified: 
Q. What direction was the defendant facing when you entered the 
room? 
A. He was facing this back wall, and there was an open drawer on this 
dresser here. 
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Q. Okay. What happens next after you have him in handcuffs? 
A. I then move him away from this open drawer area here and hand 
him off to Deputy Miller back this way. 
Q. Okay. Did you do anything else in the room at that point? 
A. Yes. I looked here at this open drawer just to make sure there 
wasn't any type of weapon or anything like that that he had placed into 
that drawer. And then as I was turning this way, I noticed an item here on 
the dresser that caught my eye. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember everything that was on the top of that 
dresser that night? 
A. I don't remember everything. I couldn't testify to everything that 
was on top of that dresser. I do remember some items. 
Q. What items in particular do you remember seeing on top of that 
dresser? 
A. Mens [sic] toiletries, deodorant, shaving cream, that type of thing, 
stuff I recognize that I would use, mens [sic]. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. I recognized a small plastic container containing what I recognized 
to be contraband. 
Q. . .. could you tell us where that plastic container was found? 
A. The items of toiletries were here [drawing on a whiteboard]. 
Several containers. There may have been a shave bag or something 
there. And then right here would have been the item that I recognized. 
Q. So it was in among those items? 
A. Right next to those, yes. 
Q. And what was the proximity to those items, including the plastic 
container, to that open drawer? 
A. Inches. Maybe a foot between here and there. 
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Q. What about the physical proximity of the defendant when you enter 
that room to those items? 
A. He was standing here. So, you know, again, a foot to 18 inches 
away. 
Q. A foot to 18 inches is your estimate? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.25, L.12 - p.29, L.8.) 
The trial court correctly concluded that the jury could reasonably infer from the 
evidence that Bennett either possessed or had the power to possess the drugs in 
question: 
And my recollection of the testimony in the trial was that when the officers 
entered the room, Mr. Bennett was standing in close proximity to a 
dresser. On top of that dresser were toiletries related to a male. The 
room was in fact the bedroom of an 11-year old girl, who was the daughter 
of the tenant in the premises; that the father of that child had allowed Mr. 
Bennett to use the room for a period of approximately two days; that over 
a substantial period of time that parent had been in and out of the room, 
had never seen any evidence of drug paraphernalia or drugs in the room. 
Further, he did not know - Mr. Walsh specifically asked the tenant 
whether he knew whether his daughter used drugs. The response, as I 
recall, was she has never been in trouble like of that kind. 
Further testimony was that Mr. Bennett was in close proximity to 
that dresser, not very far at all. 
(Tr., p.126, L.22 - p.127, L.13.) 
As the trial court properly concluded, the testimony presented at trial provided 
substantial evidence whereby a jury could have reasonably concluded Bennett knew 
about the presence of the methamphetamine and paraphernalia lying with his toiletries 
on top of the dresser in the room he was staying, and either had physical control of the 
items or the power and intention to control them. Consequently, there is no basis for 
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Bennett's contention that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of those 
charges. 
11. 
Bennett Has Failed To Show Error In The Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Bennett contends that the district court erred by declining to give at least one of 
three of his requested jury instructions on proximity. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-14; R., 
pp.121-126.) Bennett's claim of instructional error is without merit. The district court 
correctly determined that Bennett was not entitled to a "mere proximity" instruction 
because the latest version of ICJI 421 provides all the definition necessary for 
distinguishing between actual and constructive possession. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly and adequately 
present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249, 
1259 (1997); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996). 
C. Bennett Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Refusing His "Mere 
Proximity" Instruction 
In denying Bennett's request to have the jury instructed that mere proximity to a 
controlled substance is not sufficient to prove possession, the district court explained: 
The Court is going to stick with the Court's proposed 14. It is consistent 
with ICJI. And I think that the proposed Exhibit [sic] 1, 2, and 3 from the 
defendant have the potential to confuse and mislead the jury. 
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There is evidence in the record beyond mere presence and 
proximity. The core issue in this case is related to whether or not the 
defendant had the opportunity, the power to exercise control over the 
substance and knew of its presence. I think we have a clear jury 
instruction and a clear question for the jury. 
(Supp. Tr., p.102, L.23 - p.103, L.8.) 
The latest version of the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions went into effect on 
September 1, 2010. (See ICJI, Order of Aug. 26, 2010 by Chief Justice Daniel T. 
Eismann.) Although ICJI 421 does not state that mere presence is not enough to find a 
person in "possession" of a controlled substance, it sets out what is required, as follows: 
A person has possession of something if the person knows of its 
presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to 
control it. More than one person can be in possession of something if 
each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it. 
ICJI 421 (see R., p.78). The pattern ICJI instructions are presumptively correct. State 
v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 373, 376, 92 P.3d 704, 707 (Ct. App. 2004); McKay v. 
State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) (citations omitted). By 
requiring proof that a person both know of a controlled substance's presence and have 
physical control (or the power and intention to control it), ICJI 421 makes it clear that a 
defendant's mere presence is not enough to prove possession. ICJI 421 is a complete 
and accurate statement of the law. See State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356, 359-360, 900 
P.2d 1367, 1370-1371 (1995) ("No further instruction [that ICJI 421] is necessary to 
'accurately state the law."'). Bennett has failed to show that this instruction did not fairly 




The state requests this Court to affirm Bennett's convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
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